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The relative size  oi the public sector and the rate at which its size
changes may be severely underestimated in developing coun-
tries and overestimated in developed countries, if the indicator
for the size of the public sector is the ratio of current public
spending to GDP.
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Policy recommendations to reduce the growth of  support varies with the level of development.  In
public spending are haunted by the inevitability  response to rising income, real public sector
of:  spending rises most in the low-income econo-
mies, less in the middle-income economies, and
* Wagner's law - the hypothesis that with  least in the industrial market economies.
economic development an increasing share of
GDP is devoted  to public spending.  *  Similarly, the average income elasticity of
public spending drops from 2.2 in the low-
. Baumol's effect - the hypothesis that as  income economies to 1.6 in the middle-income
economies develop, public sector prices rise  economies to about 1.0 in the industrial econo-
faster than prices in the general economy.  mies.  In the long run. the size of the public
sector tapers off as economies develop.
Neither ot these hypotheses  has  adequateiv
been tested, largely because consistcnt public  This is mainlv because of changing price
sector prices are unavailable for most develop-  levels in the public sector relative to price levels
ing countries.  in the general economy.  Although Baumol's
effect cannot be observed in a majority of the
Khan proposes that the unavailability of  countries, relative prices tend to fall rarnidl%  m
consistent public sector price deflators can be  the low-;ncome countries. less rapidly in the
overcome by econometrically estimating these  middle-income countries. and actu 4lv start
series with the help of data on public spending  rising in the industrial economies.
and  the  widely  available  GDP  deflator.  He uses
this method to test both hvpotheses.  An analysis  This is believed to be due to the differences
of time-series data from 71 countries indicates  in technological intensitv between Lhe  public
that:  and private sectors, the strength of the govern-
ment in negotiating input prices, and labor
e  Although data support WaVgner's  law in the  market conditions as countnres move through
majority of developing countries. the degree of  different stages of development
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Thanks  are  due  to  the  team  members  of the  World  Development  Report  1988
for providing  the  intellectual  stimulus  for this  exercise.RELATIVE  PRICE  CHANGES  AND  THE  GROWTH  OF THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR
Restricting  the  role  of  government  in  resourc-  allocation  and  income
distribution--two  fundamental  functions  of efficient  markets--is  an important
policy  recommendation  to  countries  facing  the  dual  problem  of budget  deficits
and  negative  current  account  balances.  Virtually,  all  such  recommendations  are
geared  towards  reducing  the  seemingly  endless  growth  of government
expenditure.  Research  economists  are investigating  the  validity  of  Adolph
Wagner's  (1890)  "law",  which  stipulates  that  economic  development  results  in
an increasing  role  for  the  government  in  providing  public  services  and  hence
to  a rising  share  of government  expenditure  in total  output.  And they  wish to
see  the  law  repudiated.  However,  it is  proving  difficult  to resolve  this
issue.  After  a comprehensive  study  of 115  countries,  Ram (1987,  p. 196)
concluded  that  "one  can find  almost  as much  evidence  in favor  of ...
(Wagner's)  hypothesis  as against  it".
Academic  interest  in  the  validity  of  Wagner's  hvpcthesis,  however,  is
burdened  by the  more practical  problem  of  measuring  growth  of government.
Several  authors'  have suggested  that  due to  low  productivity  growth,  public
sector  prices  may  rise  faster  than  the  prices  in the  general  economy.  Baumol
(1967)  presented  an analytical  proof  of this  proposition  showing  that  due  to
differences  in  productivity  growth  and  wage  equalization  across  sectors,  cost
per  unit of output  in a labor-intensive  sector  increases  faster  than  in a
technology-intensive  sector.  Since  the  public  sector  is  often  labor-intensive,
this  result--also  called  Baumol's  hypothesis 2--is often  used to argue  that
measurements  of changes  in government  size  should  correct  for  relative  price
'  See, for  example,  Andic  and  Veverka  1964  and  Hinrichs  1965.
2  Although  some  economists  are  somewhat  reluctant  to  accept  Baumol's
hypothesis  (Musgrave  1969,  p. 85;  Mueller  1987,  pp.  120-21),  empirical
evidence  does  indi  ate  a higher  price  increase  in the  government  sector  for
most  developed  countries  (Beck  1976,  p. 17)  and  some  developing  countries
(Heller  1981,  p. 70).2
changes,  since  attributing  the  growth  in the  cost  of public  goods  to growth  in
government  would  distort  the  nicture. 3
But  these  suggestions  are  difficult  to implement  since  government
expenditure  d 'lators  for  a vast  majority  of developing  countries  are  either
not available  or they  are  difficult  to calculate  on a consistent  basis (Heller
1981).  Consequently,  findings  of studies  analyzing  government  expenditure
growth  differ  depending  not  only  on  whether  the  data  are  deflated  but also  on
how the  data are  deflated.  For instance,  if one  uses government  consumption
deflator  to  arrive  at real  total  government  expenditures,  government  si_..--
measured  as the  ratio  of real  government  expenditure  to real  GDP--is  found  to
decline  in  most industrial  countries,  but it rises  for  most of the  developing
countries'.  On the  other  hand if  one takes  a  weighted  average  of government
consumption  deflator  and the  implicit  deflator  for  private  consumption
expenditure,  to account  for  the  transfers  portion  of total  government
expenditure  all industrial  countries  and  most  developing  countries  show  a rise
in real  government  expenditure  with rising  income'.
Thus in order  to accurately  analyze  the  growth  of government  and  to test
the  relevant  hypotheses,  it is  necessary  to first  develop  a consistent
methodology  to  construct  price  deflators  for  the  public  sector  and its
components.  And this is  a primary  purpose  of the  present  paper.  The  other
3  While  some  authors  argue  that  expenditure  in  current  prices  is  a
better  measure  of government  size  if it is the  tax  burden  that  needs  to  be
assessed  others  argue  that  efforts  to reduce  government  expenditures  in the
face  of rising  prices  would  mean scaling  back  public  services.
'  See  Beck (1976)  for  industrial  country  results  and  Pluta (1979)  for
developing  country  results.
'  See  Beck (1979)  for  industrial  country  results  and  Pluta (1981)  for
developing  country  results.  Both  Beck  and  Pluca  worked  with small  samples--
Back  had  a sample  of 13 industrial  countries  in  his 1976  and  1979  studies,
while  Pluta  had 13 developing  countries  in  his 1979  study  and 20 in his 1981
study.  More recently  Ram (1987)  found  that  more  than  60 percent  of both
industrial  and  developing  countries  of  his 115-country  sample  showed  rising
real  government  expenditure  in  response  to increasing  real  GDF  However,  the
nature  'f the  deflator  he used is  not  clear  from  his  paper.
e  It is important  to mention  here  that  the  results  of studies,  analvzing
growth  of government,  also  differ  according  to  how government  size  is defined.
That is,  whether  one  considers  the  changes  in total  expenditure,  only changes
in  current  expenditure,  or changes  in  current  expenditure  excluding  transfers
as a measure  of changing  government  size.  However,  in studying  the  role  of3
major  focus  of this  paper,  as suggested  by the  title,  is to  measure  the impact
of relative  price  changes  on the  growth  of government  as economies  de'.  ,p.
The  paper  measures  the  real  growth  of government  by econometrically
estimating  price  deflators  for  the  public  sector  with the  help of  nominal
government  expenditure  and  GDP  deflator  series,  using  these  deflators  to
create  real  government  expenditure  series  for  71 countries,  and  estimating  the
income  elasticity  of government  expenditure.  Baumol's  'hypothesis  of increasing
costs  in the  public  sector  as well  as  Wagner's  hypothesis  of expanding
government  size  are  tested.  Although  these  tests  are  based  on time-series
data,  the  difference  in results  for  low-income,  middle-inlome  and industrial
market  economies  permits  some  conjectures  about  the  long-tezm  behaviour  of
government  size.  This is  particularly  useful,  since  analysis  of cross-
sectional  data  does  not  permit  incorporation  of relat:.ve  price  effects  on the
size  of governmente.
The findings  of this  exercise  indicate  that  both Baumol's  and  Wagner's
hypotheses  have to  be eit'.er  reformulated  or at least  qualified  in  terms  of
the  levsl  of developmen'  of the  country  under  consideration.  Statistical  tests
do not  support  Baumol's  hypothesis.  Still,  one  can  detect  a certain  pattern  in
the  evolution  of public  sector  prices  relative  to those  in the  overall conomy
by organizing  the  results  according  to per-capita  income--level  of
government  there  should  be no difference  between  a government  distributing
food  stamps  and  one  that  runs  soup  kitchens--the  former  will  be overlooked  if
one  excludes  transfers--or  between  a government  that  subsidizes  education  with
education  coupons  and  one  that  builds  and  operates  schools  and  universities--
the  latter  would  be excluded  if  one  would  consider  current  expenditures  onlv.
The idea  is to  measure  the  extent  to  which  a government  chooses  to incervene
in the  working  of the  market.  By excluding  a  particular  category  of
expenditure  one  would  bias the  analysis  against  goverrunents  that  prefer  one
kind  of intervention  instrument  over  the  cther.  Therefore,  this  study  will use
total  government  expenditure  to  measure  the  size  of government.
r  This inability  of researchers  to  measure  tre  effects  of changing
relative  prices  on the  changes  in government  size  may  well  be the  biggest
problem  of cross-sectional  analyses.  Nonetheless,  like  time-series  studies,
analysis  of cross-sectional  data is  also fraught  with  problems.  Gandhi  [197l]
reports  that  for  developing  countries  income  elasticities  for  various
categories  of government  expenditures  are  less than  unity--i.e.,  they  do not
support  Wagner's  hypothesis,  while  those  for  developed  countries  are greater
than  unity.  He argues  that  this  might  be due to the  choice  of country
groupings.4
development--of  the  countries  in the  sample.  In the  low-income  economies
(LIEs)  the  relative  prices  in the  public  sector  fall  rapidly  as incomes
ine  ease,  in  the  middle-income  economies  (MIEs)  they  start  to stabilize,  that
is,  they  fall less  rapidly,  while  in the  industrial  market  econonies  (INDs)
they  rise  with rising  ireomel.  This  U-shaped  pattern  of relative  price
movements  impacts  the  evolution  of che  real  size  of government.  Even though
Wagner's  law  of expanding  public  sector  with expanding  income  is  statistically
supported  in 58 percent  of the  countries,  a  breakdown  of the  resulcs  ^ording
to the three  country  groups  shows  that  the  real  size  of government  rapidly
increases  at lower  levels  of income,  then  stabilizes,  and  finally  tends  to
fall,  suggesting  that  in the  long-ruhn,  as economies  evolve  the  real  government
expenditure  to  GDP ratio  follows  a  path that  is  more or less  a mirror  image  of
the  movement  of relative  prices.
METHODOLOGY
If a "true"  public  sector  deflator,  E, were  available,  the  real  growch
of the  public  sector  would  be given  by:
1)  (G/E)  - Ae'
where  G is  governmenu  expenditure  in  nominal  terms,  E is the  deflator  for
government  expenditure,  A is a  constant,  t  is time,  e is the  Base of natural
logarithms,  and  g is the  estimated  real annual  average  growth  rate  of
government  expenditure.  But  since  E is not  available  for  many  countries,  one
can  make  use of the  relation  between  E and  the  GDP  deflator,  D, that  follows
from  Baumol's  hypothesis:
2)  E - cD'
Here and in  other  parts  of the  paper  reference  is  made to  changes  in
relative  prices  and  changes  in the  government-expenditure-to-GDP  ratios,
although  the  estimation  results  are in terms  of elasticities.  It is therefore
worthwhile  to  note that  for two  variable  A and  B, if the  change  in  the  ratio
of A to B is  negative,  that is,  d(A/B)  <  0, then the  elasticity  of A with
respect  to B is less  than  one, that  is,  dlnA/dlnB  <  1, and  vice versa.
Similarly if d(A/B) - 0 or >  0 then dlnA/dlnB - 1 or >  1 respectively.S
where  D is the  GDP  deflator,  d  is the  percent  change  in  E relative  to  one
percent  change  in  D, and  c is  a constant.
Substituting  (2)  in (1),  taking  logs  of both  sides,  and  expressing  the
resulting  equation  in  first  differences'  one  gets  the  following  estimable
equation:
3)  lnG - lnG.,  - g  + d(lnD  - lnD,,)  + v
where  the  subscript,  -1,  refers  to a one-period  lag  and  v to  a stochastic
error  term'°.  Once  d  has  been estimated  it is relatively  simple  to  construct
the  required  deflator  series  as:
4)  E - (D/D.,)dE.,
where  4-100  for  the  base  year".
In this  studv  such  an estimated  price  deflator  series  is  used  to get the
real  government  expenditure  series  for  che  71  countries,  which  is then  used :o
estimate  the  elasticity  of government  expenditure  with  respect  to GDP  from thr
following  equation:
5)  ln(G/E)  - a +  bln(Y/D)  +  u
9  By taking  first  differences,  the  usually  high  multicollinearity  between
t  and ln(D)  is  virtually  eliminated  and  consequently  there  is  more  precision
in the  estimation  of d.
'°  Equation  (3)  states  that  the  nominal  growth  in government  expenditure
is  equal  to the  real  growth  in government  expendicure  plu, the  change  in the
price  level  that  is appropriately  adjusted  to  reflect  the  changes  in the
relative  prices  of the  government  sector  and the  general  economy.
"  The estimation  of d  with the  help of equation  (3)  is termed  the
indirect  least  squares  method.  In this  special  case  the  reduced-form
coefficient  d is  also the  structural  parameter  d --the  structure  being  defined
by equations  (1)  and (2),  since  the  coefficient  of E in  equation  (1)  is,  by
definition,  restricted  to one.6
where  ln(.)  is the  natural  log  operator,  a is  the  intercept,  b the  elasticity
of real  government  expenditure'}  with respect  to real  GDP,  Y, and  u is the
stochastic  error  term.  All other  variables  are  as defined  above.
For  the  remainder  of the  paper  it  will  be helpful  to  keep in  mind that
Baumol's  hypothesis  implies  that  coefficient  d in  equation  (3)  be greater  than
unity  while  Wagner's  hypothesis  implies  that  coefficient  b in equation  (5)  be
greater  than  unity.
ESTIMATION  RESULTS
Data for  71 countries  and for  the  time  period  1970-86  were  used to
estimate  the  coefficients  of equations  (3)  and (5).13  In 32 countries  the
error  term in  equation  (5)  was found  to  be autoregressive,  hence in these
countries  a generalized  least  squares  procedure  was used.  Coefficients  for
equation  (5)  for  all  other  countries,  as  well as the  coefficients  for  all
countries  for  equation  (3),  which  showed  no cases  of autoregressive  errors,
weae estimated  with  the  help  of ordinary  least  squares.  Annex  Table 1  contains
the  estimated  values  of the  GDP-deflator  elasticity  of government-expenditure
deflator,  d; the  real  growth  rates  for  total  government  expenditure  and  GDP;
and the  real income  elasticity  of goverr,ment  expenditure,  b, for  the  71
countries.  The rest  of this  section  contains  comparisons  between  the  estimated
d  and the  one  calculated  from  other  published  sources.  This section  also
contains  test  results  for  Baumol's  and  Wagner's  hypotheses.
12  It is  more accurate  to  use general  government  expenditure  to  measure
government  size,  but since  data  on this  variable  are  available  for  very few
countries,  this  study  is  based  on an analysis  of central  government  data
contained  in the  IMF  Government  Finance  data files  of the  Bank Economic  and
Social  Database  (DESD).  It should  be noted  that  IMF  definition  of central
government  expenditure  includes  all  transfers--to  enterprises,  other  levels  of
government,  households,  etc.--  as well as expenditures  related  to social
security  schemes  that  are imposed,  controlled,  or financad  by the  government
(see  IMF 1986,  pp. 16, 179-85).
13 In some  countries  information  for the  first  or last  few  years  was
missing,  therefore  the  sample  size ranged  from  10 to 17 observations.7
GDP-djflator  elasticity  of Government-Expenditure  Deflator
The  estimated  values  of the  GDP-deflator  elasticity  of government-
expenditure  deflator,  a,  are  given  in column  (ii)  of  Annex  Table  1; column
(iii)  of that  table  contains  a comparable  estimate  of d, a*, that is
calculated  as  the  ratio  of growth  rates  of government  and  GDP deflators  given
in  Beck (1976)  and  Heller  (1981)"--henceforth  called  the  comparator  set.
Table  1  contains  summary  statistics  for  these  two  sets  of estimates.
TABLE  1: COMPARATIVE  DISTRIBUTION  OF ESTIMATED  GDP-DEFLATOR  ELASTICITIES  OF
GOVERNMENT-EXPENDITURE  DEFLATOR,  a  AND  THOSE  CALCULATED  FROM  OTHER  STUDIES  a*'
Countries2  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Test for  H.:  d - d*  - 0
(a) (a*)  (a) (a*)  (a-a*)  s(a.a*)3  t  Prob'
ALL  1.01 1.32  0.60  0.54  0.31  0.39  0.79  0.44
IND 5 1.49  1.80  0.37  0.35  0.31  r.28  1.11  0.30
MIE  0.73  1.01  0.53  0.41  0.28  0.48  0.58  0.57
LIE  0.41  0.94  0.18  0.17  0.53  0.04  1i.3  0.05
1)  Because  of the  unavailability  of the  significance  levels  for  individual
estimates  of a* the  comparison  disregards  the  estimated  variances  of the
individual  a  as well.
2)  Summary  statistics  are  for  countries  for  whicn  both  a  and a*  are
available.  In total  there  are  30 such  countries,  12 in the  IND  group,  16
in  MIE  And  2 in  LIE.
3)  This column  contains  the  standard  deviation  of (a-d*).
4)  (1-Prob)  gives  the  value  to  which  the  confidence  level  would  have to  be
lowered  in order  to r.ject  the  null  hypothesis.
5)  IND-Industrial  Mar'-.  Economies,  MIE-Middle  Income  Economies,  LlE-Low
Income  Economies;
The  comparisons  assume  coefficient  stability  during  the  time  periods
covered  by this  study  and  the  comparator  studies  as well  as more  or less
constant  shares  of the  different  components  within  the  government  sector.
Without  these  assumptions  no comparisons  would  be possible  since  there  are  few
studies  that  cover  the  same  time  periods  or that  use the  same  variable  to
measure  government  size.8
The  two  sets  of numbers  are  compared  to  see  whether  they  can  be
considered  samples  from  the  same  population.  The  hypothesis  of the  equivalence
of the  means  of a and a* is  tested.  The  results  in  lable  1 indicate  that  such
a  test  can  be sustained  with relatively  high  confidence.'  Even on a less
rigorous  basis  the  similarities  are  quite  obvious;  first,  the  two  sets  have
comparable  ranges-  -0.06-2  16 in  this  study  compared  to  0.29-2.49  in the
comparato:  set;  second,  the  mean  values  of the  sub-groups  have the  same
relative  size  in the two  sets-  -the  INDs  have  the  largest  mean  while  the  LIEs
have the  smallest  mean;  finally,  although  there  are  only  a few  instances  of a
one-to-one  correspondence  between  the  countries,  if they  are ranked  according
to the  two  sets  of coefficient  values  28 out  of 30 countries  lie  on the  same
side  of their  overall  mean  values'.  In other  words  indirectly  estimated
government  price  deflators re statistically  similar  t  deflators  calculated
by conventional  methods  and  hence  can  be used  in their  place  when the  latter
ate  not available'7.
Baumol's  Hy2othesis
As stated  above  public  economists  have often  used  Baumol's  (1967)
analytical  proof,  that  cost  per  unit  of output  rises  faster  in the  labor-
intensive  (government)  sector  than  in the  technology-intensive  (private)
sector,  to argue  that  the  growth  in the  size  of government  mi;ht  be
exaggerated  if  measured  by the  movement  of  nominal  government  expenditure  to
GDP ratios.  However,  there  is  no empirical  evidence  in support  of or against
this  hypothesis  or on how it  may  apply  to  countries  at different  stages  of
development.  In an effort  to  shed  some light  on this  point  Table  2 breaks  down
15  The  same is true  for the  sub-groups  IND  and  MIE,  however  for  LIE  the
hypothesis  has to  ba rejected.
Is  The  Spearman's  rank  correlation  for  the  two  sets  of values  is  0.79
whereas  the  simple  correlation  coefficient  is 0.77.
'r Note that the  estimator  a  - 1(lnE  lnD)/var(lnD)  is unbiased  because
it is an OLS  estimator.  On the  othe.  nand  d*,  as ratio  of two  growth  rates,
can  be written  as cov(lnE,t)/cov(lnD,t)  and,  although  it  may  be a ratio  of
unbiased  OLS estimators,  its  own  properties  are  unknown.  From the  values  under
consideration  it seems  that  d* systematiaallv  overestimates  d. One gets  the
same impression  on comparing  the  ratios  of column  (iv)  to (v)--two  growth
rates--with  the  OLS  estimated  elasticities  in coluxmn  (vi)9
the  significance  test  for  Baumol's  hypothesis-  -that  the  CDP-deflator
*lasticity  of government-eApenditure  deflator  is  larger  than  unizy-  -for  the
sample  countries  by stages  of  development.
TABLE  2:  TEST  RESULTS  OF BAUMOL'S  HYPOTHESIS
...  -----------  Countries  ................
Statistically
Significant  Value  of a  IND  MIE  LIE  ALL
(percent)
Less  than  or  equal  to 1.00  68  95  100  88
Larger  than  1.00  32  5  0  12
Larger  than  1.00
irresract.ve  of
significance  71  18  21  35
Number  of countries  19  38  14  71
Median  Value  of a  1.29  0.81  0.33  0.86
Note:  Significance  level  used  - n.05
Two  points  ;,re  evident  from  the  figures  in  Table  2. First,  there  is
scant  statistical  evidence  for  Baumol's  hypothesis--only  8 of the 71  countries
show  an estimated  value  for  d that  is  significantly  larger  than  unity' 8. One
may  argue  that  because  of the  rmall  time  periods  over  which  the  coefficients
are  estimated  the  significance  tests  could  be misleading  and  one  might  improve
on these  results  by using  longer  series.  However,  -ven  disregard  of the
"  While  only 5 percent  of the  coefficients  in the  INDs  are statistically
insignificant,  the frequency  of such  coefficients  rises  to 45 percer.t  in  MIEs
and 71  percent  in  LIEs.10
underlying  variations  in the  data  does  not  give  favorable  results.  Still  only
25  of the  71 countries  (35  percent)  show  any  support  for  the  hypothesis.
Second,  whether  one takes  into  account  the  underlying  variation  in the
data  or disregaids  it,  the  industrial  market  economies  are  most likely  to show
support  for  Baumol's  hypothesis.  In fact,  if  one  disregards  significance  test
79 percent  of the  INDs  show  rising  relative  prices  in the  public  sector,
compared  to  only  18 and  21 percent  in  the  middle-income  economies  and the  low-
income  economies  respectively.  This is  an interesting  result  in itself  but  by
considdring  the  relative  size  of the  average  values  of the  estimated
coefficients  for  the  three  groups--the  median  for  IND is 1.29,  for  MIE  0.81,
and  for  LIE  0.33--one  can  detect  a certain  pattern  in the  movement  of relative
prices.  The  estimated  elasticities  indicate  that  in Lhe  long-run  as incomes
rise the  relative  prices  in  the  public  sector  first  fall  rapidly,  then  they
start  stabilizing  and  finally,  as economies  are  industrialized,  they  start  to
rise.
This  apparent  contradiction  of Baumol's  hypothesis  can in fact  be
explained by the basic assumptions of the hypothesis. The conditions for
Baumol's  "effect"  to  be realized  are  a) higher  productivity  growth  in the
technology-intensive private sector and b) equai wage increases across
sectors. These two conditions will, probably, be met in the industrial market
economies but not in the other two country groups. In fact in some of the low-
income countries it might be tho  public sector that is relativelv technology
intensive, since the government has easier access to capital and to foreign
technology. In the middle-income economies this technological "superiority" of
the public sector may be relatively lower, because the private sector is more
mature and has increasing access to capital and technology, but the public
sector may still be more technology intensive.
Similarly, there is evidence that in developing countries wages in the
public sector are lower :han in the  priR.-te  sector 'Heller  and Tate 1983)  Not
only do the public sector wages remain lower in developing countries, there is
also indication that in some of these countries the wage gap between the11
government  and the  private  sector  is  widening  (Lindauer,  Meesook,  and
Suebsaeng 1988). In other words even the second condition for the validity of
Baumol's  hypothesis--of  equal  wage increases  across  sectors--is  not  met in the
developing  countries.  This  is  understandable,  since  concurrent  wage increases
across  sectors  can  only  occur  under  conditions  of f:ll  or near-full  employment
and  developing  countries  are  usually  marred  with  high  unemployment.
In addition  to  wages  and  salaries,  government  expenditure  in  developing
countries  is mainly  composed  of purchases  of goods  and  of capital  investments.
How  the  price  movements  for  these  items  affect  the  total  government
expenditure  price  level  is  not  clear.  It  might  be conjectured  that  the
government  in developing  countries,  as a large  and  reliable  costumer,  is in  a
position  of extracting  price  concessions  from  its  suppliers  and thus  keeping
its  costs  down.  However,  there  is  no indication  that  the  governments  in
developing  countries  follow  this  policy.
In short, Baumol's hypothesis depends upon the existence of higher
productivity  growth  in  the  non-public  .ector  and  similar  rise  in  wages  across
sectors.  These  conditions  in turn  require  not  only  a  well-developed  and
technology-intensive  private  sector  but  also  near-full  employment.  The  degree
to which these characteristics are present is in fact a measure of a country's
development level. The fact that Baumol's hypothesis is mostly applicable in
industrial market economies should therefore  not come as a surprise.
Waener's Law
The impact of this peculiar behavior of relative prices can be seen in
the movement of real government expenditure and the empirical evidence for
Wagner's hypothesis. Column (vi) in Annex Table 1 contains the estimated
income elasticity of government expenditure--the coefficient b in equation 5--
for the 71 countries in our sample. A value for  b that is significantly larger
than one will support Wagner's hypothesis, that increases in national income
lead to proportionately larger increases in government expenditure. Table 3
contains a summary of the test results arranged by the three country groups in
the sample.12
TABLE 3:  TEST  RESULTS  OF WAGNER'S  HYPOTHESIS
---------------  Countries  -----------------
Statistically
Significant  Value  of S  IND  MIE  LIE  ALL
(percent)
Less than  or equal  to 1.00  53  45  21  42
Larger  than  1.00  47  55  79  58
Larger  than 1.00
irrespective  of
significance  53  71  93  70
Number  of Countries  19  38  14  71
Median  Value  for  6  1.04  1.63  2.23  1.60
Note:  Significance  level  used  - 0.05
Although  the  results  seem  to support  Wagner's  Law--58  percent  of the
countries  have income  elasticity  of government  expenditure  that  is
significantly  larger  than  one  and  if  one disregards  the  variances  of the
estimated  coefficien,ts,  the  percentage  of favorable  cases  goes  up to 70
percent--the  more interesting  aspect  of this  exercise  is  revealed  on examining
the  breakdown  of these  results.  Both  the  average  coefficients  for  the  three
groups  as well  as the  relative  frequency  of coefficient  values  that  are
significantly  larger  than  one  indicate  that  the  rate  at which  real  government
size  expands  with increasing  income  decreases  as countries  develop.  The  median
income  elasticity  of  government  expenditure,  for  instance,  declines  from  2.2
for  low-income  economies  to 1.6  for  middle-income  economies  to  around  1 for
industrial  market  economies.  Similarly,  the  percent  of countries  that  show  a
significantly  larger-than-one  value  for  b drops  from  almost  80 percent  in the
LIE to 55 percent  in the  MIE to  47 percent  in the IND.  In other  words,  the
relationship  between  income  and  government  expenditure  in the long-run  takes
on a form  that is  almost  a mirror  image  of the  movement  of relative  prices;  as13
countries pass  through the different stages of development the size of
government--measured as the ratio of real government expenditure to GDP--first
rapidly expands, then it starts to stabilize and finally as the countries
industrialize it starts shrinking.
The reason for this pattern, obviously, lies in the movement of relative
prices. As we saw earlier the public sector price level relative to the price
level in the overall economy follows a U-shaped evolutionary path. In early
stages of development the relative prices in the  public sector decrease but at
later  stages  of development  they  start  to  rise.  Consequently,  even though  the
nominal  government  expenditure  to  GDP ratio  may increase,  as documented  in
some  studies'9,  in real  terms  it  would  show  a quadratic  movement.
It is important  to  point  out  that  the  results  on government  expenditure
growth  reported  here are  broadly  consistent  with those  presented  in  other
studies. As was noted at the beginning of this paper, analyses of time-series
data  often  favor  the  hypothesis  of rising  real  government  expenditures  ..
response  to rising  income  with a somewhat  similar  dichotomy  between  the
developing  and  developed  countries  in terms  of the  behavior  of government
expenditure  to  GDP ratio  (Beck  1976;  Pluta  1979;  and  Ram  1987)'.  However,
none  of these  st.dies  exDlict:y, exDore ehe imoact 3-  :han-nz  - 'sc.e
prices  on real  government  size  or the  likely  form  of the  relationship  between
real  government  expenditure  and  real  gross  national  product  as  countries  move
from  one  development  stage  to  another. 2'
'a  See,  for  instance,  Peacock  1985.
20  Actually,  the  results  of the  present  study  show  a slight  improvement
over Ram's 1987 analysis--probably one of the more comprehensive studies on
the  subject.  On analyzing  real time-series  data  for  the  period  1960-80,  Ram
found that 64 percent of his 115 countries--65 percent of the developing
countries and 62 percent of the developed countries--had a larger-than-one
government expenditure elasticity of GDP. In comparison, the present study
finds that 70 percent of the 71 country sample--77 percent of the developing
countries and 53 percent of the developed countries--show a larger than one
value  of the  elasticity.
21  There  is,  of course,  a whole  group  of studie'  that  examine  the
relation  ship  on the  basis  of cross-sectional  data  but since  one  cannot
incorporate  changes  in relative  prices  in  cross-sectional  analyses  results
from  these  studies  cannot  be considered  comparable  to  what is  presented  here.
Further  none  of these  studies  allows  for  a quadratic  relationship  between  the14
A final point needs to be made regarding the implication of this study
that because relative prices in the public sector drop in developing countries
this sector must be experiencing productivity gains. Since analysis of
government expenditure is an analysis of the input side rather than the output
side--output quantities and output prices for the public sector are virtually
impossible to measure--the changes in input prices may not necessarily measure
changes in productivity as such, unless the implicit assumption holds, that
changes in real government expenditure adequatly reflect changes in public
sector output. Without recourse to concrete examples, one can safely presume,
that in many developing countries this might not be the casc.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A number of points have been investigated  by this study. First, It has
been demonstrated that to analyze real size of government one does not
necessarily need ptice deflators for the public sector. On the basis of
current government expenditure and the general GDP deflator one can
econometrically estimate a price deflator series that can then be used to
calculate constant government expenditures.
Second, statistical tests do not support the generally held notion of
increasing costs per unit output (Baumol's hypothesis) in the public sector.
However, if one is willing to overlook the relatively large variances of the
estimated coefficients--and so refrain from making probability statements--one
can detect a certain pattern in the evolution of public sector prices relative
to those in the overall economy as countrIes pass through different
development stages. In most of the low-income and middle-income countries the
government expenditure to GDP ratio and level of development--with the
possible exception of .Musgrave  (1969, p.11 9). On analysing tax-to-GNP ratios
on the basis of cross-sectional data for a group of 30 to 40 councries, he
discovered that the elasticity of ;his ratio with respect to income, first
rises, then declines and eventually becomes negative. Since tax and
expenditure are highly correlated, one can consider this finding as somewhat
similar to that of the present study.15
GDP-deflator  elasticity  of government  expenditure  deflator,  a,  is less  than
one,  while  in  most industrial  market  economies  it is larger  than  one.  The
average  values  of estimated  coefficients  for  these  three  country  groups
indicate  that  in  LIEs the  relative  prices  in the  public  sector  actually  fall
as incomes  increase,  in the  MIEs  they  start  to  stabilize--i.e.,  they fall  less
rapidly--while  in the  INDs  they  rise  with rising  income.  The  apparent
refutation  of Baumol's  hypothesis  in the  developing  countries  can in fact  be
explained  with the  help  of the  two  basic  requirements  of the  hypothesis;  a)
higher  productivity  growth  in  the  private  (technology-intensive)  sector  and  b)
equal  wage increases  across  sectors;  these  conditions  are  more  easily  met in
the  industrial  market  economies  than  in the  other  two  country  groups.
Finally,  the  pattern  of relative  price  movements  has its  parallel  in the
changes  in the  real  size  of government.  Even though  Wagner's  law  of expanding
public sector with expanding income is statistically supported in 58 percent
of the countries, a breakdown of the results according to the three country
groups  shows  that  the  real  size  of government  rapidly  increases  at lower
levels  of income,  then  stabilizes,  and finally  tends  to fall,  suggesting  that
in the  long-run  the  real  government  expenditure  to GDP  ratio  follows  a
quadratic  developmental  path as  economies  evolve  from  developing  to developed
countries.16
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ANNEX TABLE 1: MEASURES OF REAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE  AND INCOME GROWTH
GDP Deflator Elasticity  ReaL Annual Average  Income
of Goverrnent Expenditure  Growth  Rate  Elasticity
DOeflator  (d)  (percent'  of
Govt. Exp.
Country  This Study  Other Studiest1)  Govt. Exp.  GDP  (b)  N
0i)  00i  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vi;)
INDUSTRIAL MARKET ECONOMIES
Australia  1.52 *  NA  0.75  3.28  0.11  17
(0.24)  (2.39)  (0.77)  (0.11)
Austria  1.84  2  2.49  0.40  3.05  0.19 *  16
(0.38)  (2.2)  (0.59)  (0.08)
Belgium  1.29  NA  3.24  2.32  1.53 *  16
(0.32)  (2.19)  (0.74)  (0.09)
Canada  1.93 *  2.25  -1.28  4.31  *0.49  13
(0.21)  (2.27)  (1.28)  (0.11)
Doenrk  1.43  1.81  0.17  2.22  0.04  16
(0.43)  (3.8)  (0.81)  (0.19)
Finland  1.34 *  1.69  1.23  3.02  0.44 *  14
(0.27)  (2.97)  (0.97)  (0.08)
France  1.80  1.51  -2.87  2.31  *1.08  '4
(0.27)  (2.59)  (0.52)  (0.2)
IceLand  0.85 *  NA  9.06  2.71  2.66 **  14
(0.19)  (7.06)  (1.84)  (0.43)
Ireland  1.09 *  1.35  5.53  3.65  1.54 **  15
(0.25)  (3.29)  (0.99)  (0.12)
ItaLy  0.37 '  NA  8.56  2.02  3.96  '  '.
(0.29)  (4.29)  (0.99)  (0.25)
Luxemberg  -0.04  NA  12.71  2.12  3.90 *  15
(0.24)  (2.11)  (1.21)  (0.98)
Netherland  1.72  *  2.27  0.46  1.57  0.22  14
(0.17)  (1.03)  (0.05)  (0.06)
Norway  0.32 *  NA  10.36  3.99  2.64  15
(0.17)  (1.48)  (0.64)  (0.1)
Spain  1.14 *  NA  5.07  3.01  1.47  15
(0.22)  (3.05)  (0.79)  (0.2)
Sweden  1.39 *  1.69  1.79  1.92  1.04 *  17
(0.33)  (2.96)  (0.66)  (0.18)
Switzerland  1.07 *  1.37  3.57  1.10  0.73  15
(0.37)  (2.11)  (1.03)  (0.6)
United  Kingdoc  1.08 *  1.59  2.51  1.79  1.49  '  16
(0.14)  '1.73)  (0.75)  (0.16)
United  States  1.05 *  1.71  3.94  2.59  1.55  '  15
(0.29)  (1.99)  (0.71)  (0.11)
W. Germany  2.16 00  1.91  *1.09  2.25  -0.38  16
(0.33)  (1.57)  (0.53)  (0.12)
............--  ---  --  ...  ....  ...  .............  . ...  ...  ...  . ..  . ...  ...  ..........  ....................  ...
GROUP MEDIAN  1.29  1.70  2.51  2.31  1.04
..  . ..  . . ..  ..  . ..  ..  ..  . . ..  ..  .....  ....  .....  .N 
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ANNEX  TABLE  1:  MEASURES  OF REAL  GOVERNMENT  EXPEND.IURE  ANO INCOME  GROWTH
GOP Deflator  Elasticity  Real  AnnuaL  Average  Income
of Goverrment  Expenditure  Growth  Rate  ELasticity
Deflator  (d)  (percent)  of
Govt.  Exp.
Country  This  Study  Othar  StudiesCl) Govt.  Exp.  GOP  (b)  N
05)  (ii  (iff)  tiv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)
MIDDLE-INCOME  ECONOMIES
Argentina  0.97  *  NA  10.58  1.10  3.53  **  14
(0.05)  (6.48)  (3.5)  (0.99)
Bahamas  0.33  NA  9.31  1.62  1.85 *  14
(0.49)  (3.82)  (2.23)  (0.35)
Barbados  0.83  *  NA  4.70  1.40  2.02  *  14
(0.28)  (3.7)  (1.8)  (0.26)
BraziL  1.00  *  0.92 (5)  8.23  6.10  1.27  *  16
(0,06)  (3.4)  (1.8)  (0.07)
Careroon  1.98  NA  1.92  9.31  0.30  *  11
(1.32)  (12.78)  (2.71)  (0.09)
ChiLe  0.91  *  NA  5.28  1.51  1.32  '  15
(0.MP)  (3.2)  (2.21)  (0.41)
Colombia  0.72  NA  11.54  4.38  2.50  *  13
(0.41)  (8.49)  (1.46)  (0.26)
Costa  Rica  0.29  0.86  (2)  20.95  3.30  4.55  *  15
(0.17)  (4.16)  (2.2)  (0  95)
Cyprus  0.11  0.87  (2)  15.54  10.18  1.16  *  17
(0.14)  (3.6)  (3.59)  (0.16)
Oon.  Republic  0.81  *  0.29  (2)  3.84  4.11  0.84  14
(0.22)  03.2)  (1.97)  (0.12)
Egypt  0.56  NA  8.82  6.93  1.32  '2
(0.74)  (9.91)  (2.76)  (0.12)
Gabon  0.18  NA  21.26  5.52  1.65  *  11
(0.54)  (12.52)  (7.92)  (0.45)
Greece  1.77  *  2.27  -5.22  2.86  -1.41  14
(0.69)  11.46)  (2.05)  (0.24)
Guatemala  2.50 **  NA  -8.95  3.34  -1.45  12
(0.73)  (7.7)  (2.56)  (0.32)
Guyana  0.52  NA  12.15  1.35  5.94  *-  12
(0.47)  (5.93)  (4.34)  (1,0a),
Indonesia  1.11  *  0.98  (2)  7.99  5.74  1.22  15
(0.19)  (3.64)  (2.05)  (0.09)
!sraeL  5.86  *  9A  16.42  3.25  4.5Q *  4
(0.06)  (4.9)  (2.54)  (0.44)
Korea  1.29  *  1.38  (3)  4.49  7.96  0.58  *  16
(0.24)  (3.75)  (1.83)  (0.05)
Liberia  0.26  0.55 (3)  6.88  -0.35  3.72  *  13
(0.68)  (5.36)  (4.12)  (1.97)
Malaysia  0.06  0.88  (2)  13.83  6.70  2.24  14
(..C)  (3O5NT  )2.3)  (5.,3)
....  ...  ....  ...  ...  ....  ...  ...  ....  ...  ...  ....  ...  ...  ....  ...  ...  ....  ...  ...  (CONTD)19
ANNEX TABLE  1:  MEASURES OF REAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND  tNCOME GROWTH
GOP Deflator Elasticity  Real Annual Average  Income
of Government Expenditure  Growth Rate  Elasticity
Deflator (d)  (percent)  of
Govt. Exp.
Country  This Study  Other  Studies(1)  Govt. Exp.  GOP  (b)  N
(i)  (ii  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)
MaLta  0.95 *  NA  8.05  8.30  0.82 *  13
(0.51)  (3.24)  (2.3)  (0.08)
Mexico  0.68 *  1.15 (4)  19.78  4.59  3.65 *  14
(0.17)  (5.62)  (2.68)  (0.54)
Morocco  1.60 *  1.03 (2)  2.37  4.31  0.78 *  16
(0.44)  (4.11)  (2.4)  (0.33)
Nicaragua  0.80 *  NA  14.59  0.48  1.16  17
(0.11)  (4.71)  (3.74)  (1.03)
Oman  1.00 *  NA  6.36  6.32  0.90 *  14
(0.12)  (4.16)  (3.52)  (0.18)
Panama  2.84  NA  -5.63  4.06  -0.96  13
(0.69)  (4.66)  (1.99)  (0.13)
Paraguay  0,14  0.95 (2)  16.65  6.38  2.40  1C
(0.16)  (3.31)  (1.86)  (0.2)
Singapore  0.94  1.00 (2)  6.88  7.10  1.01 *  14
(0.66)  (4.39)  (3.03)  (0.21)
South Africa  0.09  NA  17.10  2.70  6.00 *-  13
(0.26)  (3.51)  (1.04)  (0.41)
Syria  0.39  NA  '3.01  8.27  1.60  10
(1.05)  (15.25)  (5.55)  (0.17)
Thailand  0.11  1.18 (3)  14.78  6.31  2.49 *  14
(0.24)  (2.37)  (1.39)  (0.06)
Tunisia  0.82 *  1.15 (2)  11.30  4.98  2.07 **  13
(0.25)  (2.71)  (1.19)  (0.11)
Turkey  0.75 *  NA  13.23  5.40  2.47 *  16
(0.12)  (4.14)  (1.84)  (0.27)
Uruguay  0.71 *  0.73 (2)  14.66  1.56  3.39 **  15
(0.15)  (7.27)  (2.06)  (1.1)
Venezuela  0.72 *  NA  7.27  2.22  2.61 *  16
(0.28)  (3.98)  (2.62)  (0.36)
Yemen Arab Rep.  0.23  NA  21.88  6.66  3.64 *  13
(0.55)  (8.91)  (4.17)  (0.29)
Yugoslavia  0.71 *  NA  5.56  4.34  0.52  16
(0.23)  (7.55)  (3.56)  (0.36)
Zimnbabwe  1.34  NA  2.08  2.87  0.46  11
(0.78)  (9.4)  (2.79)  (0.18)
.............  ....  ..  - --  ----------  . ..  ........  ..  ..  ..  ..  ....  ..  ..  .....  --  ----------  ..................................  .......................
GROUP MEDIAN  0.81  0.96  9.07  4.36  1.63
----.---.-.--.....-.......................... COONTO)2  0
ANNEX  TABLE  1:  MEASURES  OF REAL  GOVERNMENT  EXPENDITJRE  AND INCOME  GROWTH
GDP  Deftator  Elasticity  Reat  Annuat  Average  Income
of Government  Expenditure  Growth  Rate  ELasticity
Deftator  (d)  (percent)  of
Govt.  Exp.
Country  This  Study  Other  StudiesCl) Govt.  Exp.  GOP  (b)  N
(i)  ~~~(ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)
LOW-INCOME  ECONOMIES
Burkina  Faso  1.06  H  4.64  3.58  1.70  t*  13
(0.65)  (6.35)  (2.7)  (0.22)
Surma  0.02  NA  11.06  5.46  2.06  **  13
(0.09)  (1.3)  (1.1)  (0.12)
Ethiopia  -0.32  NA  15.69  2.39  7.02  10
(0.57)  (3.31)  (2)  (0.88)
Gambia  1.78  *  NA  1.88  4.60  0.69  11
(0.54)  (6.45)  (4.12)  (0.42)
Haiti  0.81  NA  6.60  2.64  2.40  *  1
(0.48)  (5.29)  (3.21)  (0.4)
India  -0.10  NA  15.88  4.81  3.49  ^*  13
(0.27)  (2.15)  (1.15)  (0.17)
Mali  -1.27  NA  30.29  1.10  12.72  '*  10
(1.19)  (10.03)  (3.  9)  (5.25)
Nepal  0.32  NA  14.72  2.91  5.08  *  14
(0.19)  (2.09)  (1.45)  (0.27)
Pakistan  0.5d  '  1.1Z  (2)  12.58  5.96  1.92  *  14
,0.28)  (3.24)  (1.53)  t0.06)
Senegal  1.25  *  NA  5.29  3.00  1.61  **  12
(0.4)  (4.43)  (2.37)  (0.22)
Sri  Lanka  0.23  0.77  (2)  15.18  4.69  3.52  *  16
(0.52)  (7.28)  (3.17)  (0.15)
Tanzania  -0.87  NA  32.72  2.26  13.60  **  14
(0.62)  (10.16)  (2.89)  (1.45)
Togo  0.34  NA  5.45  1.59  1.10  10
(0.64)  (4.53)  (3.31)  (0.72)
Zaire  0.91  *  NA  1.10  -0.05  1.77  *  13
(0.2)  (7.61)  (3.74)  (0.86)
............  -------------  . . ..................  ..  ...........  .........................  ..............  ............  ....................
GROUP  MEDIAN  0.33  0.94  11.82  2.96  2.23
NOTES: 1)  The  figures  in  this  column  are  calculated  from  Beck  (1976)  for IndustriaL  Market
:conomies  and Greece;  ana trom  He(.er  (1981)  for  4iddLe-  and  Low-income  Economies.
The ti.ne  periods  are foLLowing:  2eck's:  1950-52  to 1968-70;  HeLLer's:  (2) 1973-77,  (3)  1974-77,
(4)  1972-76,  (5)  1973-75.
Coefficients  are  significantLy  greater  than  ZERO  at the  5  percent  LeveL.
*  Coefficients  are significantLy  greater  than  ONE  at the  5  percent  level.
Parentheses  below  the  coefficient  estimates  contain  the  standard  errors.PRE  Work¢ig  Pacer Series
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